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Abstract
This study provides a new understanding of the adver-
sarial attack problem by examining the correlation between
adversarial attack and visual attention change. In particu-
lar, we observed that: (1) images with incomplete attention
regions are more vulnerable to adversarial attacks; and
(2) successful adversarial attacks lead to deviated and
scattered attention map. Accordingly, an attention-based
adversarial defense framework is designed to simultane-
ously rectify the attention map for prediction and preserve
the attention area between adversarial and original images.
The problem of adding iteratively attacked samples is also
discussed in the context of visual attention change. We hope
the attention-related data analysis and defense solution in
this study will shed some light on the mechanism behind
the adversarial attack and also facilitate future adversarial
defense/attack model design.
1. Introduction
Many standard image models are recognized to be highly
vulnerable to adversarial attack, which adds small pertur-
bation to the original samples but maliciously mislead the
model prediction. Extensive studies have been conducted
towards designing different adversarial attack methods to
fool state-of-the-art convolutional networks [4, 6, 8, 12, 16].
Applying adversarial attack in automatic visual systems
like self-driving vehicle can lead to catastrophic conse-
quences [6]. It is thus necessary to develop effective defense
methods against the potential attacks.
The attempts to develop adversarial defense solutions
can be coarsely classified into three groups. (1) Denois-
ing preprocessing, transforming the input samples before
feeding into the raw model, e.g., a generative adversarial
network is proposed to eliminate the potential adversarial
perturbation [13]. (2) Model modification, adding more lay-
Figure 1. Visual attention of successful-attacked image (top row)
and failed-attacked image (bottom row). In each row, we show
the original image, original image’s attention map and adversarial
image’s attention map. Below the attention map shows the
predicted object label.
ers or sub-networks and changing the loss functions of raw
model, e.g., Papernot et al. designed a student network for
knowledge distillation [3] from raw network and reduce the
sensitivity to directional perturbations [9]. (3) Adversarial
training, adding adversarial samples into the training set to
update the model parameters, e.g., Madry et al. proposed to
replace all clean images with adversarial images to protect
against adversary [7]. It is discussed in [1] that the former
two groups of defense methods largely work by obfuscating
gradients, which provide only “a false sense of security”
and have been successfully attacked by circumventing the
gradient calculation. Adversarial training, although simple
and straightforward, does not rely on obfuscated gradients
and has been proved to improve model robustness by
correcting sample distribution [14]. Adversarial training
is recognized as a way of regularization and updates the
decision boundary around adversarial samples [17].
Adversarial training provides a fundamental and flexible
defense framework compatible with different realizations.
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The performance of specific realization basically depends
on the following three factors: (1) Regularizing model to
focus on robust features. It is observed that adversarial
perturbations contribute to amplify the importance of low-
confidence features to change the output prediction [18].
Modifying models to restrict the model prediction focusing
on robust features is expected to improve the robustness
of original samples. (2) Reducing feature distribution
divergence. In addition to injecting the adversarial sam-
ples into training set, further constraints can be designed
between original and adversarial samples to alleviate fea-
ture fluctuation caused by adversarial input perturbations.
(3) Selecting adversarial training samples. Tramer et al.
claimed that the performance of adversarial training largely
depends on how strong of the adversarial samples to be
injected [17]. Selecting moderately strong adversarial
samples therefore serves as another factor contributing to
defense performance.
This study falls into the adversarial training group and
attempts to address the above factors to improve the defense
performance. Visual attention has been used to explain
which region of image is responsible for the network’s
decision [19]. Through data analysis, we observed some
correlations between visual attention and adversarial at-
tack. Fig. 9 shows two example images from CIFAR-
10. The attention map of original images and the cor-
responding adversarial images are illustrated for compar-
ison. Quick observations include: (1) By comparing the
attention maps of the two original images, we found that
the upper image relies on the fractional object region for
prediction and turns out vulnerable to the adversarial attack
(“trashcan”→“coffeepot”). While, the lower image has a
more complete and accurate region of interest and retains
the predicted label. (2) By examining the change of
attention map from original to adversarial images, we found
that successful adversarial attack tends to deviate and scatter
the attention area. The distraction of visual attention makes
the prediction focusing on incomplete and wrong regions.
These attention-oriented observations inspire us to de-
sign adversarial defense solution by rectifying and pre-
serving visual attention. The proposed Attention-based
Adversarial Defense (AAD) framework consists of three
components (as illustrated in Fig. 4): (1) attention rectifi-
cation component, to complete and correct the prediction
of original images focusing on the actual object of interest;
(2) attention preservation component, to align the visual
attention area between adversarial and original images to
alleviate the feature divergence; and (3) adversarial training
sample selection, to add moderately strong adversarial
samples into training set based on the attention evolution
analysis. The main contributions of this study are two-
fold:
• We conducted a comprehensive data analysis and ob-
served that successful adversarial attack exploits the
incomplete attention area and brings significant fluctu-
ation to attention map. This provides a new understand-
ing of the adversarial attack problem from the attention
perspective.
• A novel attention-based adversarial defense method is
proposed to simultaneously rectify and preserve the
visual attention area. Qualitative and quantitative results
on MNIST and CIFAR-10 demonstrate its superior
defense performance. The framework is flexible that
alternative modeling of attention loss can be readily
integrated into existing adversarial attack as well as
defense solutions.
2. Attention-oriented Data Analysis
Visual attention helps explain to what extent each pixel
of a given image contributes to the prediction of the net-
work. Since adversarial attack is designed to change
the previous prediction, we are motivated to examine the
relationship between visual attention and adversarial attack.
This data analysis section attempts to address the following
three questions:
1. What kinds of images are vulnerable to adversarial
attack?
2. How the visual attention of adversarial image deviates
from the original image?
3. How visual attention changes in iterative attack and
contributes to the attack result?
Before presenting data analysis setting and observations,
we first make agreements on several key terms:
• Attention map & attention area: In this study, we obtain
the attention map for a given input image x using Grad-
CAM [11] 1, which is denoted as:
g(x) = Grad-CAM(x). (1)
To prevent low-contribution pixels affecting the analysis
results, we further introduce attention area as the binary
mask indicating image pixels with attention value above
a threshold κ:
Att(x) = sign(ReLU(g(x)− κ)), (2)
where ReLU(·) is the activate function of network.
• Ground-truth area: Taking object classification as ex-
ample, attention area corresponds to the region where
the classification method relies to recognize certain
1 To guarantee the derived data observations are insensitive
to the choice of attention map generator, we also employed
LIME [10] for data analysis and obtained consistent observations.
Due to space limitation, visualization and quantitative results
about LIME are provided in the supplementary material.
Isucceed Ifail
Percentage IoUAtt GT Percentage IoUAtt GT
74.1% 0.647 25.9% 0.701
Table 1. Average IoU between attention and ground-truth area.
object. This study uses ground-truth area to indicate
the actual object region, which is obtained by object
segment mask. The ground-truth area of object l in
image x is denoted as GTl(x).
• Adversarial attack: The adversarial examples used in
data analysis, unless otherwise specified, are generated
by StepLL [17]:
xadv = xori − ε · sign(5xL(f(xori), yLL)) (3)
where xori, xadv represent original and adversarial im-
ages, ε is the step size, f(·) is the original network, and
yLL denotes the label with the lowest confidence.
2.1. Adversarial Attack Vulnerability
It is noticed that adversarial attack not always succeeds
and fails on some samples. This motives us to study what
characteristics make these samples robust to the attack and
retain the original decision. Specifically, we examined
the attention area of different images in the context of
classification problem, and analyzed its correlation with
the vulnerableness to adversarial attack. This is Fig.9
The data analysis was conducted with the classification
network, InceptionV3 [15], and over the 50,000 images in
the development set of ImageNet 2012 [2]. Since we view
visual attention as support on the highest output, the 38,245
development images with the correct top-1 prediction con-
struct the image set Iatt for attention analysis.
For each image x ∈ Iatt, its attention map g(x) was
calculated, and the ground-truth areaGTl(x) corresponding
to the correctly predicted label l was also extracted. To
examine whether the visual attention matches the actual
object region, we made a comparison between the attention
area and ground-truth area. The attention area was extracted
by selecting image-specific threshold κ so that Att(x)
and GTl(x) have the same area size. IoU (Intersection-
over-Union) between attention and ground-truth area was
calculated as follows:
IoUAtt GT (x) =
Att(x)
⋂
GTl(x)
Att(x)
⋃
GTl(x)
(4)
We separate images from Iatt into two subsets, those
retaining the original decision where adversarial attack
failed to construct Ifail, and those changing decision where
adversarial attack succeeded to construct Isucceed. The
percentage of images falling in each subset and the corre-
sponding average IoUAtt GT are summarized in Table 1.
Isucceed Ifail
Percentage Confidence Percentage Confidence
82.8% 0.8944 17.2% 0.7941
Table 2. Percentage and average confidence score of images with
IoU< 0.5.
Since all the images are correctly classified by the original
network, both subsets show large IoU scores. Between
the two subsets, Ifail obtains notably higher IoU than
Isucceed. Focusing on the 5,857 images with IoU< 0.5, we
examined the percentage of images falling in each subset
and the average confidence score on the correct label. The
results are reported in Table 2. Combining results from
Table 1 and Table 2, we observed that the images with low
attention IoU tend to obtain low confidence score in the
targeted correct label and have higher vulnerability to be
adversarially attacked.
2.2. Attention Deviation from Adversarial Attack
Adversarial samples only impose small perturbations
on the original input but encounter significant change on
the output prediction. This motivates us to explore where
factors contribute to the non-trivial output change. This
subsection studies the attention deviation from adversarial
attack, and examines the consistency of the attention area
between original samples and adversarial samples.
We utilized the same image set Iatt for data analysis.
Assuming xadv represents the adversarial sample generated
by attacking original sample xori, Att(xori), Att(xadv)
respectively denote the attention area of original and ad-
versarial samples. The raw attention map generated by
Grad-CAM constitutes an 8 × 8 grid. The attention area of
original and adversarial samples are constructed by keeping
the same number of grid cells with the highest attention
score. Under a certain number of grid cells #cell, the IoU
of attention area between original samples and adversarial
samples was calculated as follows:
IoUori adv(x) =
Att(xadv)
⋂
Att(xori)
Att(xadv)
⋃
Att(xori)
(5)
Varying the number of remained grid cells from 5 to
30, we summarized the average IoUori adv in Table 3 for
Isucceed and Ifail respectively. We find a consistent result
for different selections of grid cells: the IoU score of failed
attack group is significantly higher than that of successful
attack group. Heavy attention deviation of adversarial
samples from original samples offers a strong indication
of successful attack. Other than the decrease of overlap
of attention areas, it is also evidenced from Fig. 9,11 and
other samples that successful adversarial attack tends to
make attention scattered 2. A possible explanation for these
2 We leave further discussion and utilization of the attention
#cell IoUori adv for Isucceed IoUori adv for Ifail
5 0.393 0.574
10 0.490 0.677
20 0.609 0.766
30 0.676 0.807
Table 3. Average attention IoU between original and adversarial
samples.
Figure 2. The change of attention map in iterative attack. (From
left to right columns: original image, attention map for an original
image and adversarial images after 1–5 rounds of attack.)
observations is that successful adversarial perturbation on
the input misleads the output prediction by distracting and
scattering the original attention.
2.3. Attention Analysis on Iterative Attack
It is recognized that iterative adversarial attack is usually
more effective than single-step attack [6]. But there is
no consensus why iterative attack works better. This sub-
section explores the change of visual attention in iterative
attack, to shed some light on this problem and inspire
how to select samples for adversarial training. Fig. 11
visualizes the change of attention map in iterative attack for
two images from Ifail. It is shown that the attention area
shrinkages and scatters during the multiple-step attacks.
The two images are correctly classified as “dog” after
single-step attack and misclassified as other class after the
second round of attack.
In Table 4 we report the percentage of images suc-
cessfully/failed attacked and their average attention IoU
between original and adversarial images in each round of
attack. Observations include: (1) When the adversarial
perturbation is imposed in multiple rounds, the attention
IoU between original and adversarial images consistently
reduce. After two rounds of attack, 96.8% images are
successfully attacked to change their previous prediction.
This provides an attention-based explanation that iterative
attack gradually deviates the original attention area and
generates stronger adversarial samples. (2) When iterative
attack continues (e.g., over two rounds according to data
analysis), the percentage of images successfully attacked
remains stable but the IoU further reduces. Lower attention
IoU and scattered attention area (as shown in Fig. 11) is
scatter observation in future study.
Attack
round
Isucceed Ifail
Percent IoUori adv Percent IoUori adv
1 74.1% 0.451 17.2% 0.643
2 96.8% 0.277 3.2% 0.605
3 98.1% 0.209 1.9% 0.547
Table 4. Percentage and IoU change in iterative attack.
Figure 3. Example original images (top) and the corresponding
adversarial images after three rounds of attack (bottom).
likely to generate “too strong” adversarial images: notable
perturbations make the adversarial images visually different
from the original images, which violates the intention
of adversarial attack. Fig. 15 shows three examples of
adversarial images after three attack rounds, which appear
very differently from the original images. It is obvious
that adding these “too strong” adversarial images may
deteriorate the training process and lead to overfitted model.
3. Attention-based Adversarial Defense
The above data analysis demonstrates that successful
adversarial perturbation leads to significant visual attention
change. Our defense solution is therefore motivated to
restrict the attention change to improve adversarial ro-
bustness. Specifically, observations from data analysis
correspondingly inspire the three components in the pro-
posed attention-based adversarial defense framework (as
illustrated in Fig. 4): (1) attention rectification, to guide
the attention area of original samples to the ground-truth
area; (2) attention preservation, to punish the deviation of
attention area from adversarial to original samples; and (3)
adversarial training sample selection, to add moderately
strong adversarial samples into the training set to prevent
overfit as well as improve robustness.
3.1. Attention Rectification
As evidenced from Table 1, it is more vulnerable to
adversarial attack for those samples whose prediction rely
on unrelated region instead of the ground-truth area. One
possible explanation is that these samples failing to focus on
the actual region of interest suffer more from the adversarial
perturbations and have higher risk to be misclassified.
Figure 4. The proposed attention-based adversarial defense framework. The upper and lower part correspond to the training over original
and adversarial samples respectively. The change of the attention map is simultaneously constrained by the rectification loss, preservation
loss, and classification loss. The same parameters are shared by the four convolutional neural networks.
Therefore, our first component is motivated to guide the
model to focus more on the ground-truth area for prediction.
Since the ground-truth area is generally unavailable dur-
ing the training process, we turn to rectify the completeness
of the attention area. The idea is that the attention area
should include all the regions critical for prediction. In other
word, the regions beyond the attention area are expected to
contribute trivially to the correct prediction.
To realize this, we integrate the generation of attention
area into the end-to-end training process. As illustrated on
the upper part of Fig. 4, a hard mask is imposed according
to the extracted attention area:
xm = x (1−Att(x))), (6)
where x is the original image, xm denotes the image after
mask, and  denotes element-wise multiplication. To
guarantee all critical regions are excluded from xm, it is
desired x and xm lead to the prediction results as different
as possible. Therefore, x and xm are fed into the same
convolutional network f(·) to obtain the prediction vector
f(x) and f(xm), and we expect the difference between
f(x) and f(xm) as much as possible. The same constraint
is added to the adversarial image. For each original image
x and the corresponding adversarial image xadv , the goal is
to minimize the following rectification loss:
Lr(x) = −
(L(f(x), f(xm)) + L(f(xadv), f(xmadv)) (7)
where L(·, ·) denotes certain distance measure between two
vectors.
3.2. Attention Preservation
It is observed from Sec. 2.2 that the shifted prediction
results of adversarial image partially owes to the deviation
of attention from the original image. This component
attempts to preserve the attention map between original
and adversarial images to reduce the influence of input
perturbation to the output prediction result.
The original image x and adversarial image xadv are
issued to the same convolutional network to obtain attention
map g(x) and g(xadv). A preservation loss is designed to
minimize the pairwise difference between the two attention
maps:
Lp(x) = L
(
g(x), g(xadv)
)
(8)
Combining with the rectification loss defined in the
previous subsection, the overall loss for given original
image x is calculated as follows:
Ltotal(x) = αLc(x) + βLr(x) + γLp(x), (9)
where Lc is for correct classification and defined as the
standard multi-label soft margin loss, α, β and γ are weight
parameters reflecting the importance of the respective com-
ponent.
The three losses in Eqn. (9) jointly regularize the at-
tention of both original image and adversarial image to
the critical regions for prediction. This provides a general
attention-based framework to improve adversarial robust-
ness by rectifying and preserving visual attention. Alterna-
tive realization of the rectification loss and preservation loss
are compatible with the framework.
3.3. Adversarial Training Sample Selection
The above attention rectification and preservation design
constraints to make the training samples robust to potential
adversarial attacks. Another critical problem remains what
samples to impose these constraints to further improve
the performance of adversarial training. This subsection
elaborates our solution using attention map for training
sample selection.
Figure 5. Attention map evolution in different training epochs.
For each example image on the left, we show on the right the
attention maps of its original image (top row) and adversarial
image (bottom row). The six attention maps are extracted at
training epoch 0, 10000, 20000, 30000, 40000 and 50000. Below
each attention map shows the predicted object label and the
corresponding confidence score.
It is recognized that the defense performance of ad-
versarial training benefits from strong attack methods to
generate the adversarial samples [17]. The fact that iterative
attack leads to stronger adversarial samples motivates us to
also add the iteratively-attacked samples into the training
set. However, as observed from Sec. 2.3, many rounds
of attack potentially generates visually different images
overfitting the model. A moderate round of attack is
expected to satisfy the following two requirements: (1)
the attack is strong enough that most adversarial images
successfully change the previous prediction; and (2) the
attack is not too strong to generate significantly different
and even negative samples. Based on the data observations,
in this study, we select a moderate round of two to generate
adversarial samples and add into the training set.
Specifically, given each original image x, we iteratively
generate adversarial images in two rounds as xadv1 and
xadv2. The rectification loss and preservation loss defined
in Eqn.(7),(8) are modified as follows:
Lr(x) =−
(L(f(x), f(xm)) + L(f(xadv1), f(xmadv1))
+ L(f(xadv2), f(xmadv2))
)
,
Lp(x) =L
(
g(x), g(xadv1)
)
+ L(g(x), g(xadv2)).
The influence of adding more rounds of adversarial images
are provided and discussed in the experiment section.
4. Experiment
4.1. Experimental Setting
The proposed Attention-based Adversarial Defense
(AAD) framework can be applied with different
convolutional networks. In this study, we conducted
qualitative and quantitative experiments with two simple
networks, LeNet on MNIST dataset and CifarNet on
CIFAR-10 dataset [5]. For Lenet, the primary parameters
are empirically set as follows: batchsize = 50, learnning
rate = 0.001, iteration = 24,000, keepprop = 0.5. For
CifarNet, we employ the commonly used parameters as:
batchsize = 100, learnning rate = 0.0001, iteration = 50,000,
keepprop = 0.5. For distance measure L(·, ·) in attention
losses calculation, we used l2-norm in Eqn.(7) to consider
inter-class confidences and l1-norm in Eqn.(8) to encourage
sparsity 3.
4.2. Visualization of Attention Map Evolution
The proposed AAD framework is expected to adapt the
network to make predictions of both original and adversarial
images focusing on the critical regions. Fig. 10 visualizes
the evolution of attention map for two CIFAR-10 images as
the training epoch increases.
It is shown that for each example image, on the top row,
the attention area of original images is gradually rectified
to the object of interest. The prediction confidence first re-
duces due to the consideration of attention rectification loss
and preservation loss, and then recovers to guarantee high
prediction confidence as well as complete attention area. On
the second row, the raw attention area of adversarial image
deviates much from the original image (first column on the
right), which leads to the misclassification at the beginning
(“deer”→“frog”, “automobile”→“dog”). As the adversarial
training proceeds, the attention area of adversarial image
becomes consistent with that of original image, and together
fit onto the object of interest at last. The confidence score
for the correct object class also increases as the attention
area evolves, to demonstrate the improvement of robustness
against potential attacks.
4.3. Performance on Adversarial Defense
To demonstrate the defense performance of the proposed
AAD framework, we compare its classification accuracy
with clean model and state-of-the-art defense model from
Madry et al. [7]. Other than StepLL, two additional
attack methods are also employed to generate adversarial
samples [17]: R+StepLL, randomized single-step attack,
and Iter-LL, two rounds of attack by StepLL. For CifarNet
on CIFAR-10 dataset, the weight parameters α, β, γ are set
3 Alternative distance measures are also allowed to encourage
different characteristics of the attention map.
CIFAR-10 MNIST
original image StepLL R+StepLL Iter-LL original image StepLL R+StepLL Iter-LL
clean model 80.6% 2.5% 10.4% 22.1% 99.1% 46.9% 89.9% 45.2%
Madry et al. 78.0% 61.5% 45.4% 5.3% 99.3% 97.5% 98.8% 60.4%
AAD (ours) 79.1% 74.9% 47.2% 71.5% 99.2% 98.1% 99.4% 61.8%
Table 5. Defense performance comparison with Madry et al. [7] under different adversarial attack methods.
(a) (b)
Figure 6. Example images from CIFAR-10 (a) and MNIST (b).
On the left shows the original image. The top row on the right
shows the adversarial image generated from Iter-LL with Madry’s
method and its corresponding attention map. The bottom row
shows the results with the proposed AAD method.
in a ratio of 8:4:1. For LeNet on MNIST dataset, the weight
parameters α, β, γ are set in a ratio of 2 : 1 : 2. The
obtained classification accuracy results in different settings
are reported in Table 11.
On CIFAR-10 dataset, the proposed AAD method
achieves superior defense performance under all the three
attack methods. With the adversarial images generated
from StepLL and Iter-LL, AAD obtains comparable
classification accuracy with the original images. It is noted
Madry’s method fails to defense against Iter-LL, with
classification accuracy as low as 5.3%. Fig. 6(a) shows
an example image with its adversarial image and attention
map from Madry’s method and AAD. It is observed that
Madry’s method relies on the attention region beyond the
object of interest for prediction. AAD manages to rectify
and preserve the attention even for the strong adversarial
image. Moreover, the consideration of multi-round training
adversarial samples further improves AAD’s robustness to
iterative attacks.
On MNIST dataset, AAD achieves slightly better per-
formance than Madry’s method. It is perceived that the
handwritten digit in MNIST to be classified basically po-
sitions in the center and covers a dominant region of the
image. Fig. 6(b) shows such an example. In this case, the
benefit from rectifying and preserving attention is limited.
The proposed attention-based defense framework is more
suitable for images with arbitrary object size and complex
background. In the future we will validate this by evaluating
AAD on ImageNet and other large-scale datasets.
The defense performance against black-box attack is also
evaluated. Taking the proposed AAD defense method for
example, the black-box attack is conducted as follows: (1)
CIFAR-10 MNIST
StepLL Iter-LL StepLL Iter-LL
Madry et al. 56.1% 35.1% 97.1% 86.3%
AAD (ours) 60.5% 49.8% 96.6% 90.2%
Table 6. Defense performance against black-box attacks.
Two AAD models are trained under the identical configu-
rations, denoted as defense1 and defense2; (2) Adversarial
images xadv are generated by certain attack method (e.g.,
StepLL) over the model defense1; (3) Black-box attack
is evaluated by examining the classification accuracy of
xadv in the other model defense2. Table 6 summarizes
the defense performance of Madry’s method and AAD
against black-box attack from StepLL and Iter-LL. Consis-
tent results are obtained with the above white-box attack:
the proposed AAD achieves superior performance than
Madry’s method on CIFAR-10 dataset, and comparable
performance with Madry’s method on MNIST dataset.
4.4. Parameter Sensitivity Analysis
The proposed attention-based defense framework mainly
involves two sets of parameters: the weight parameter in
Eqn. (9), and the iterative round of attack for adversarial
sample generation. This subsection serves to analyze the
performance sensitivity to these parameters.
We first adjusted the weight parameter to analyze the
contribution of respective loss. The weight parameter
sensitivity analysis experiment is conducted by fixing two
of the weights and tuning the other weight. In Fig. 13(a)–
(c) we show the defense classification accuracy of CIFAR-
10 against different attack methods by tuning α, β, and γ
respectively.
When setting the weight for respective loss as 0, i.e.,
excluding the corresponding classification, rectification and
preservation constraint, the classification accuracy curves
experience a consistently significant decline in Fig. 13(a)–
(c). The sharp decrease in Fig. 13(a) is due to the fun-
damental role of classification loss. The notable change
in Fig. 13(b)(c) validates the importance of attention rec-
tification and preservation component towards adversarial
attacks. Fig. 12 visualizes the attention map of two example
images and their corresponding adversarial images w/ and
w/o the proposed attention losses. The results justify
our motivation to introduce the attention losses to rectify
(a) classification loss (b) rectification loss (c) preservation loss
Figure 7. Adversarial defense performance with different weight parameter configurations.
and preservation the attention area of both original and
adversarial images. The best performance is generally
obtained when setting α : β : γ = 8 : 4 : 1. Around
this ratio the relative stable accuracy curve shows that
the proposed method is not very sensitive to the weight
parameter configuration within a certain range.
Figure 8. Attention maps from raw model, model considering
rectification loss, model considering preservation loss, and model
with both rectification and preservation losses.
Round Original image StepLL R+StepLL Iter-LL
1 77.7% 62.4% 44.0% 6.0%
2 79.1% 74.9% 47.2% 71.5%
3 79.9% 73.2% 38.1% 67.9%
4 79.7% 62.9% 44.1% 50.9%
Table 7. Defense classification accuracy by adding adversarial
training images from different rounds of attack.
We further examined the influence of iterative round of
attack for adversarial sample generation. The classification
accuracy on CIFAR-10 is reported in Table 7 by adding 1–
4 rounds of adversarial images into the training set. The
result is basically consistent with the observation from
Sec. 2.3. Considering only adversarial images from single-
step attack obtains inferior defense performance especially
Original image StepLL StepLL+attention (σ = 13)
100.0% 26.2% 24.3%
Table 8. Adversarial attack classification accuracy on Iatt.
when dealing with strong attacks like Iter-LL. Redundant
rounds of attack tends to generate noisy training samples
and deteriorate the training process. The rapid decline from
3 to 4 round validates this claim.
4.5. Attention-based Adversarial Attack
The data analysis observes that attention deviation con-
tributes significantly to a successful adversarial attack. The
proposed AAD method exploits this observation to im-
prove the robustness to potential adversarial attacks. From
a counter perspective, this observation also inspires the
design of new attack methods by taking attention into
consideration.
We implemented a preliminary version attention-based
adversarial attack by modifying the standard StepLL in
Eqn. (3). Specifically, the adversarial image is updated
by finding a gradient direction amplifying the attention
difference. We use l1-norm to calculate the difference and
the adversarial attack function is modified as follows:
xadv = xori−ε·sign(Ox(L(f(x), yLL)−σ‖Att(x)−g(x)‖1))
(10)
where σ is the weight parameter controlling the contri-
bution of attention deviation. In this way, in addition
to changing the prediction score of the most confident
class, the adversarial perturbation is designed also towards
deviating the attention area. Table 8 shows the classifi-
cation accuracy of the 38,245 development images Iatt
from ImageNet2012. This preliminary result validates the
effectiveness of considering attention into adversarial image
generation. We emphasize that similar attention deviation
term can be integrated into any gradient-based adversarial
attack methods. More results and discussion are provided
in the supplementary material.
5. Conclusions
This study provides a new perspective to analyze the
adversarial defense/attack problem by considering atten-
tion. Qualitative and quantitative experimental results
demonstrate the effectiveness of attention-based adversarial
defense/attack. In the future, we are working towards
seeking insight of the mechanism behind the attention per-
turbations from adversarial attack, as well as investigating
other phenomenon concerning attention observations (e.g.,
the scattered attention when adversarial attack proceeds) to
inspire more comprehensive defense/attack solution.
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In the first section, we provide further attention-
oriented data analysis results from another attention
generation method, LIME (Local Interpretable Model-
Agnostic Explanation). The second section discusses
that rectification/preservation of attention turns out a
common phenomenon for adversarial defense solutions.
In the third section, we introduce a general framework to
enhance existing adversarial attack solutions by adding
attention attack loss. More results and discussions on
attention-augmented adversarial attack are also presented.
A. LIME-based Attention Data Analysis
In Sec. 2 of our main paper, we conducted attention-
oriented data analysis by using Grad-CAM. To guarantee
the derived data observations are insensitive to the choice
of attention map generator, we also used another attention
generation method for attention data analysis and this sec-
tion introduces the data analysis results.
LIME learns an interpretable model locally around the
prediction, to explain the predictions of classifiers in an
interpretable and faithful manner. [10] Similar to Sec.2.1
and Sec.2.2 in the main paper, we use LIME to re-examine
the observations concerning adversarial attack vulnerability
and attention deviation from adversarial attack. Fig. 9
illustrates LIME-generated attention map by retaining the
top 8 features. For the successfully attacked images (top
row), the similar phenomenon of shrinking and scattered
attention area is observed.
By analyzing the same 38,245 images from Iatt, we
summarize the respective statistics regarding average IoU
in Table 9 and Table 10. Consistent observations are
obtained with a different number of retained features: (1)
images vulnerable to adversarial attack tend to have a lower
IoU score; (2) successful adversarial attack deviates the
attention map of adversarial images from original images.
Figure 9. Visual attention of successful-attacked image (top row)
and failed-attacked image (bottom row) by LIME. In each row
we show the original image, original image’s attention map and
adversarial image’s attention map. Below the attention map shows
the predicted object label.
#.Features Isucceed Ifail
8 0.413 0.442
10 0.484 0.516
Table 9. Average attention IoU between attention and ground-truth
area.
#.Features Isucceed Ifail
8 0.138 0.212
10 0.159 0.241
Table 10. Average attention IoU between adversarial images and
corresponding original images.
B. Discussion on Attention Rectifi-
caiton/Preservation of Existing
Adversarial Training Solutions
Inspired from the attention shrinkage and deviation ob-
servations, this study explicitly designs attention rectifica-
tion and preservation solutions to improve adversarial ro-
bustness. By analyzing other adversarial defense solutions,
we found that attention rectification/preservation turns out
a common phenomenon to improve adversarial robustness.
Fig. 10 and Fig. 12 respectively illustrate the attention
map change of four example images for adversarial training
on StepLL [6] and on ensemble of four attack methods [17].
It is shown by adding adversarial images into the training
set, two adversarial training methods both have a effect
to rectify and preserve the attention maps of adversarial
images. Since standard adversarial training solutions have
no explicit regularization concerning attention, attention
rectification/preservation is not guaranteed in many cases.
Fig. 13 and Fig. 14 shows some examples on which the
two examined adversarial training methods fail in defense
towards the adversarial attack. In these examples, no
clear attention improvement is observed. This demonstrates
that attention rectification/preservation plays a critical and
common role in the successful adversarial defense. In
future work, we will conduct an in-depth analysis to explore
the mechanism behind the adversarial attack and attention
change.
Figure 10. Four example cases of successful defense for
adversarial training on StepLL [6]. For each example we show
three images: leftmost is original image, followed by attention
map of adversarial image for the pure model, and attention map
of adversarial image for the adversarially trained model.
Figure 11. The framework of A3Attack.
Figure 12. Four example cases of successful defense for
adversarial training on ensemble of four attack methods [17]. For
each example we show three images: leftmost is original image,
followed by attention map of adversarial image for the pure model,
and attention map of adversarial image for the adversarially trained
model.
Figure 13. Four example cases of failure defense for adversarial
training on StepLL [6]. For each example we show three
images: leftmost is original image, followed by attention map
of adversarial image for the pure model, and attention map of
adversarial image for the adversarially trained model.
Figure 14. Four example cases of failure defense for adversarial
training on ensemble of four attack methods [17]. For each
example we show three images: leftmost is original image,
followed by attention map of adversarial image for the pure model,
and attention map of adversarial image for the adversarially trained
model.
C. More Results on Attention-augmented Ad-
versarial Attack
In this section, we present more results on Attention-
Augmented Adversarial Attack (A3Attack) introduced in
Sec.4.5 of the main paper. For existing adversarial attack
methods using gradient information, A3Attack is ready to
be integrated by considering additional attention attack loss.
The overall framework is shown in Fig. 11. Attention
area of original samples and adversarial samples are both
extracted, and the difference between two attention areas is
utilized to define attention attack loss to encourage attention
derivation in the adversarial samples to be generated. The
total attack loss is the combination of the new attention
attack loss and the traditional attack loss from existing
attack methods, e.g., FGSM, Stepll, PGD, etc.
l1-norm can be used to calculate the attention difference,
and the attention attack loss is defined as:
AttentionAttackLoss = −‖Att(x)− g(x)‖1 (11)
Taking StepLL as the existing attack method, the total attack
loss can be represented as:
TotalAttackLoss = L(f(x), yLL)− σ‖Att(x)− g(x)‖1
(12)
where σ is the weight parameter controlling the contri-
bution of attention deviation. The adversarial sample of
StepLL+A3Attack is generated as follows:
xadv = xori−ε·sign(Ox(L(f(x), yLL)−σ‖Att(x)−g(x)‖1))
(13)
We carried out experiments on two widely used attack
methods, StepLL and FGSM, to validate the effectiveness
of attention augmentation. Specifically, we use Iatt as the
dataset and select σ=10, =4/255, iterations=3. Table 11
shows the classification accuracy results. It is shown that
considering additional attention attack loss contributes to a
stronger attack and more adversarial images are misclassi-
fied.
StepLL FGSM
StepLL alone StepLL+A3Attack FGSM alone FGSM+A3Attack
3.8% 3.3% 13.6% 10.8%
Table 11. Adversarial attack classification accuracy on Iatt.
Fig. 15 illustrates the attention map change for
one example images under StepLL (top row) and
StepLL+A3Attack (bottom row). The additional attention
attack loss imposes a clear effect to gradually distract the
attention from the original region, which increases the
confidence to mislead the classifier.
Figure 15. Attention map change in different attack rounds under
StepLL (top row) and StepLL+A3Attack (bottom row).
